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MELEAGER AND THE MOTIFEMIC ANALYSIS OF MYTH: A RESPONSE

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IN A PREVIOUS ISSUE (vol. 16.1-2), *Arethusa* printed, side-by-side with our article on *Meleager* and *Odysseus*, a critique of it by Glenn Most which has prompted us to offer some responses and clarifications. Our paper was an attempt to develop a model for the analysis of myths which would allow precise comparison of a number of specific myths belonging to a definable set. As our specific myths we took the tales of *Meleager* and *Odysseus* — both hunting tales in which the hunt is a rite of passage to manhood, a ritual of initiation. We characterized *Odysseus* as a story of successful maturation, and *Meleager* as a story of failure. Then we asked why *Meleager* fails and *Odysseus* succeeds, and argued that *Meleager* commits hubris by violating *kairos*, respect for the appropriate time and place. He intrudes his courtship of *Atalanta* into his initiatory hunt, and this proves disastrous.

In order to put on a firmer foundation the judgment that *Meleager's* hubris leads to his premature death, we regarded our narratives as consisting of two signs: the narrative elements — motifs — themselves, and their chronological sequence. The judgment “*Meleager* is hubristic” is then seen as a Peircean logical interpretant of certain motifs in his tale, and of their temporal order.¹ We argued that, when *Meleager* elected to woo *Atalanta* during his initiatory hunt, he chose an improper occasion. It was not the right time, he should have waited. *Odysseus* tells us what the proper occasion is: *Odysseus* woos *Penelope* only after his initiatory hunt, only after his acceptance into maturity.

When Most faults us for our “retention of temporal sequence as a fundamental category” (200-01) we can only respond that we were not establishing categories: we regard chronology as fundamental when a fundamental interpretation depends upon it, not otherwise. When we com-

pare these two particular tales as members of a particular set “hunting-maturation myth,” chronology emerges as a sign having the interpretant, “Meleager is hubristic.” In another set of tales it is possible that sequence would make no semantic difference; in the case of this set, the difference is crucial.

The judgment “Meleager is hubristic” is an interpretant of the Meleager tale as a whole. Nowhere does it appear within our analysis of the narrative structure. Other interpretants, however, are employed in the construction of our model. We posit four levels on which a text can be analyzed: the *ipsissima verba*, and three levels of increasing abstraction, the motif-structure (or plot), the motif-type structure, and the motifemic-structure (or fabula). Each narrative level, taken as a whole, provides a logical interpretant for the next more concrete level, and each individual item on a particular level provides an interpretant for the corresponding item on the next lower level. For example, the motifeme “H (partly) passes initiatory test” is an interpretant for the motif-type “H kills A” taken as a sign at level 3 of our model, and “H kills A” is an interpretant for the motif “Meleager kills the boar” taken as a sign at level 2, which is itself an interpretant of *syn . . . apekteinen Meleagros* in the motif texture at level 1. Level 2 abstracts from level 1. Level 3 abstracts and generalizes (“H” instead of “Meleager”) from level 2. Level 4 specifies the function of the narrative elements within their sequence. All three processes — abstraction, generalization, specification — entail interpretation of signs.

That our approach is — contrary to Most’s assessment on p. 200 — quite semiotic should be clear by now. But we must stress the point that our levels are in no way intended to exhaust the structural analysis of the myths. We repeat that the interpretant “Meleager is hubristic” is not to be found on any of our levels, and might be taken as helping to constitute a deep structure in Lévi-Strauss’ sense. Lévi-Strauss says of Formalism that “en s’attachant exclusivement aux règles qui régissent l’agencement des propositions, il perd de vue qu’il n’existe pas de langue, dont on puisse déduire le vocabulaire, à partir de syntaxe” (1960:32). This charge becomes inappropriate to our work when we insist that the construction of our levels entails the selection and employment of all interpretants needed to make the causal sequence of motifemes explicit. “Meleager’s hunt is initiatory,” “Meleager’s maternal uncles must certify him,” etc. — surely these interpretants, essential to the making of our model, are “vocabulary items.” Had we, instead, sought to place *Meleager* alongside other tragic tales, we would have selected and used the interpretant “Meleager’s hamartia leads to tragedy.” We would have been developing, perfectly legitimately, an

Aristotelian tragic structure. Both Aristotle's structures, and ours, are forms; neither excludes, or could exclude content.

Most criticizes us for making a "leap" from level 3 to level 4: on the motif-type level and beneath it, "Meleager's hunt is just that: a hunt. Only (the motifeme) level can turn it . . . into a ritual of initiation" (211). Since all interpretation requires a leap, in the sense that there is always a gap between a sign and its logical interpretant, we have indeed made a leap. But for this no apology is needed. And the leap, the interpretation, can occur anywhere, not just on level 4. As soon as we read the word *hēbēsas* in the *Odysseus* motif texture, we begin to interpret the story as having to do with maturation. As we note the importance of Odysseus' maternal uncles, and express this in the motif-type "HMat(rikin) join hunt," we are coming to the interpretant that the hunt is initiatory. We do the same thing when we note the youth of Meleager, and the importance of *his* uncles. We confirm this interpretant when we compare the two tales on the motif-type level. Similarly, we have been arriving at the interpretation that Meleager acts in violation of *kairos*, hubristically, while Odysseus does not. The aggregate of knowledge of cultural phenomena connected with hunting, courtship, and initiation seeps into one's thinking at every level, and constantly informs and reforms one's interpretation.

What makes the motifemic level appear to be a leap is that it *specifies* those interpretants of the earlier levels which are needed to clarify the causal connection among the motifemes. Some, not all: e.g., it specifies certain actants as certifiers of the novice's initiatory success; it implies that courtship during initiation converts certifiers to adversaries; but it does not specify that hubris leads to tragedy.

Probably our article should have spelled out this interpretative and selective process in more detail. But it is still curious that Most calls specifying the tale as initiatory a "*salto mortale*" (211). He has acknowledged that "there is no doubt that the myth of Meleager has initiatory features" (208). He speaks of "the essence of the myth, in initiatory terms" (208). When an interpretation which he accepts appears on the motifemic level, how can the leap seem deadly?

Most's acceptance of our fundamental interpretation of the hunt in these tales as initiatory makes other aspects of his critique exceedingly puzzling. He feels that there is no evidence to connect hunting rituals with "any period in which Homeric or even pre-Homeric myths can persuasively be placed" (210). He criticizes us for seeing in our myths a reflex of cultural phenomena and ritual. But initiation *is* ritual, and a cultural phenomenon. If the hunt in *Meleager* is initiatory, then *Meleager* reflects a ritual. (Not,

of course, that it is a cult myth; it incorporates a ritual, as the myth *Orestes* incorporates a purification rite — see Aesch. *Eum.* 276-85. Most's discussion of myth and ritual on 210-11 is largely vitiated by his failing to note this distinction.) Either the teller of *Meleager* knew of the initiatory hunt as a cultural fact, or his myth preserved the memory of it. *If* it is conceded that the mythic hunt is initiatory, it hardly matters to us when the myth is dated, so long as it is reasonably close to the date of the *Odyssey*.

What worried us was that the evidence for the initiatory hunt in Greece apart from our myths is slender (not, we think, non-existent — Most ignores our references to Brelich and Vidal-Naquet). If the reader feels that the mythic evidence is good as far as it goes, but that historical data are required to achieve conviction, something is wanted which we cannot supply in any abundance. We therefore endeavored to locate the crucial version of the story in a culture and a time where either the initiatory hunt was still likely to have been practiced, or where at least the memory of it was likely to be preserved — where hunting was still economically important enough for people to recognize it as a potential rite of passage. Certainly Dark Age Aetolia satisfies these criteria better than fifth-century Athens.

Since the main purpose of this dating was to make our interpretation of the mythic hunt as initiatory more convincing, and since Most (at several places in his paper) accepts this interpretation, his concern over the dating of the initiatory motif is perplexing. *Meleager* in some version was certainly told in Aetolia in the eighth century. The maternal uncles and Meleager's youthful age almost certainly belong in that version. These details — and the comparison with *Odysseus* — are the mythic evidence for the hunt's initiatory character. As already said, a mythic initiatory hunt must mirror the cultural phenomenon of initiation, contemporaneous or earlier. Hence the ritual hunt was practiced, or remembered, in eighth century Aetolia. This, of course, is to argue from accepted mythic evidence to culture. Since we in our paper were concerned only to say that the *mythic* hunt is initiatory, we went, as much as we could, in the other direction: we based our interpretation of the myth *Meleager* not only upon the myth itself and its similarity with *Odysseus*, but upon locating the myth in an appropriate cultural context.

Most's challenge to our early dating of Meleager's love for Atalanta is much more understandable, for he is aligning himself with a number of modern scholars. Our reply must therefore go into considerable detail. The points of contention are four. First, how are we to interpret the fact that the love-motif is not specifically attested before the middle of the fifth cen-

ture? Second, what did Homer leave out of his obviously abbreviated account? Third, how do we account for the presence of the trophies of the Calydonian hunt in the temple of Athena Alea in Tegea by at least 600 B.C.? Fourth, what is the motivation, divine and human, for the quarrel between Meleager and his uncles in the pre-Homeric version?

There is no doubt that the motif of Meleager's love became very popular after Euripides' time, and that we have no direct pre-Euripidean witness to it. Most thinks that therefore the motif was invented in this period, probably by Euripides. But this is to assess the phenomenon of sudden popularity incorrectly. The love-motif was popular after Euripides because Euripides was *influential*, not because he was inventive. Most says that Euripides made up the motif; we say that he found it, or could have found it, in a relatively obscure poem. All three of us agree that he used it, that he was influential, that it became popular. Each theory accounts equally well for the break in the myth's history. It will not do to argue that the era when an idea gained sudden and lasting popularity is necessarily the era that gave it birth: that would force us to give Dalton sole credit for the atomic theory of matter, or make Frege and Russell the first to invent the propositional calculus.

Most does not really address the problem of the text of *Iliad* 9: he agrees that it has an "often noted abbreviated quality" but says nothing directly of what was left out. Indirectly, however, he suggests that Homer omitted two motifs present in his source: Ancaeus' death or wounding (206), and the killing of one of the uncles, "in the course of the ritual, whether by inadvertence or in passion" (208). On Ancaeus' death we have no opinion or comment, except that if Ancaeus died in the Homeric source, this further weakens another hypothesis of Most's, which we shall discuss presently, that Ancaeus was a successful participant who escaped the boar (207). As to the death of an uncle "in the course of the ritual," Most is not clear whether he thinks this happened during the hunt or after it: "by inadvertence" implies that it was during; "in passion" implies that it was afterwards. There is no testimony in any source known to us to support an inadvertent killing — if Most knows such a source, he should tell us. A killing in passion *after* the hunt is attested, at least in later sources. But this gives us no help in reconstructing the pre-Homeric account of the hunt itself.

The presence of the Calydonian tusks at the Arcadian temple is a problem that Most does address. We argue that these trophies were in the temple at a very early date, and that the Arcadians must have said that Atalanta put them there. The only way, according to the available testimony, that she can have acquired them is from Meleager. And Meleager's

motive, according to such testimony as assigns him a motive, is his love for her. Granted, he has another *justification*, her valor in hitting the boar first. But this is not enough to *motivate* him. Therefore, we reason, the early Arcadian version included the motif, “Meleager loves Atalanta. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that a sixth-century hydria seems to connect the trophies with Atalanta.

Most indirectly acknowledges the power of this argument by offering two exceedingly unattractive alternatives to it. He suggests that the Calydonian trophies are in the Tegean temple because Aleus, grandfather of the Arcadian hunter Ancaeus, put them there “to commemorate his grandson’s death in the hunt” (207). But if Ancaeus died in the hunt, how did Aleus get the trophies? How did the Tegeans account for their presence in the temple? The Tegean tradition supplies an answer: the trophies were given by Meleager to Atalanta, the Arcadian huntress. She could easily have been said to have put them in Athena’s temple. This, however, is the explanation that Most wants to reject. But what other explanation is there? The tradition is clear that these are Calydonian tusks, from a Calydonian boar: how did they get from Aetolia to Arcadia?

Most’s second alternative is that Ancaeus did not die in the hunt. Aleus dedicated the tusks “to celebrate his grandson’s successful participation in the hunt” (207). But what ancient source, late or early, Arcadian or Aetolian or from anywhere else, tells us that Ancaeus won the trophies? Most says that the authors are “brave indeed” (205) in attributing a motif which is certainly as old as Euripides to an earlier source. But he does not hesitate to speculate that a motif which is found in no source whatever may well have belonged to Arcadian tradition.

It is not as if Arcadian tradition had vanished from sight. It is reflected in Scopas’ sculpture.² It is found in Pausanias’ pages. In them, as in every other source the authors know of, Ancaeus is said to have died, or is presented as so gravely wounded that he can hardly have survived. Certainly he is never depicted as able to rise from the ground and “participate successfully in the hunt.” Most says that he “was killed (Apollodorus 1.8.2) or wounded (Paus. 8.45.2)” (207), leaving the unwary reader thinking that in Pausanias Ancaeus does not die. But in one passage, not cited by Most, Pausanias says specifically that Ancaeus *does* die (8.4.10, in the History of Arcadia). And these are the words of the passage Most refers us to (8.45.2):

. . . Τεγεάταις ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς τοσάδε ἐξ δόξαν. τὸν γὰρ ἐν Καλυδῶνι ὕν Ἀγκαῖος ὑπέμεινεν ὁ Λυ-

κούργου τρωθείς, καὶ Ἀταλάντη τοξεύει τὸν ὕν καὶ ἔτυχε πρώτη τοῦ θηρίου· τούτων ἕνεκα αὐτῇ ἡ κεφαλὴ τε τοῦ ὕος καὶ τὸ δέρμα ἀριστεῖα ἐδόθη.

The Tegeans have the following deeds of their own which tend to their glory. Ancaeus, son of Lycurgus, though wounded, awaited the attack of the boar in Calydon, and Atalanta shot at the boar, and was the first to hit the beast. On this account the head and hide of the boar were given to her as tokens of valor.

This really is the passage Most invites us to read. It contains no emendations, there are no MS variants; these are Pausanias' words. They occur in a chapter devoted to what the Tegeans themselves say about their own history in an attempt to put two Tegean mythic heroes in the best possible light. All that can be said in favor of Ancaeus is that, though wounded, he did not run, but abided the boar's attack. That he died has been mentioned already (8.4.10); in this passage the Tegeans are obviously claiming that Ancaeus died bravely. But of Atalanta, we hear that she was the first to hit the animal and get the trophies. And this passage is supposed to help persuade us that Atalanta did *not* get the trophies, that "according to Tegean legend, Aleus . . . dedicated within [the temple] the tusks which had so nearly taken [Ancaeus'] life" (207).

Turning now to the question of the Munich hydria: Most apparently thinks that we were unaware that the subject matter was a wrestling match. He labors to make clear that it was, and then says that the boar's head and hide were introduced either by mistake, "or simply to facilitate the identification of Atalanta (whose traditional association with the Calydonian boar hunt no one will dispute)" (207). In other words, the head and hide say to Most, "This is Atalanta, who hunted the boar." But surely if the head and hide establish a connection between Atalanta and the Calydonian hunt, they reinforce a connection between her and the *trophies* of that hunt, for they *are* the trophies. Hence Kuhnert diffidently suggests that the Calydonian saga had already in the sixth century developed the motif of Atalanta receiving the trophies. Most, taken in by his diffidence, actually places Kuhnert among those who believe firmly that Euripides invented this motif (Most n. 5).

We come now to the fourth point, Artemis' continuing wrath after the death of the boar. We recall that Oeneus forgot to sacrifice to Artemis, and that she sent the boar in angry response. The boar destroyed trees and

killed men, enough, one would suppose, to have appeased even the savage Artemis Laphria. In any case, when the goddess strikes again at the family of Oeneus, and destroys Meleager, we expect her to have been provoked a second time. And Meleager's sullying his initiatory hunt by using it to court Atalanta is a splendid, apt provocation for the Virgin goddess. Here especially the Homeric account is so abbreviated as to suggest that Homer omitted this — for him intolerable — motif. Meleager kills the boar; the next event is described thus: "She [*scil.* Artemis] made a great din and uproar about it, about the head and shaggy hide of the boar, between the Curetes and great-hearted Aetolians. As long as Meleager fought . . ." (9.547-50). We do not learn whether the son(s) of Thestius are killed in din and uproar, or later; we therefore do not know just how the war started; and we do not hear why Artemis stirred up the quarrel. The authors proposed, as the omitted reason, Meleager's inappropriate and offensive courtship. Most says no: Artemis' enduring wrath "is adequately motivated by Oeneus' snub. A wrathful deity will not be mollified by the trampling of vineyards and crops: only human blood will do" (206).

This mistake is almost as serious as the citation of Pausanias to support the hypothesis of Ancaeus the successful hunter. That the wrath of a god invariably issues in bloodshed is spectacularly untrue. Let a few examples suffice: Admetus, like Oeneus, forgot to sacrifice to Artemis, and found his bed chamber filled with snakes, a disagreeable experience for him but, as we know from the *Alcestis*, not fatal (Apollodorus 1.9.14). Zeus was angry over the murder of Apsyrtus and drove the Argo off its course until the Argonauts, or Jason and Medea alone, were purified by Circe (Apollodorus 1.9.24, Apollonius 4.557 ff.). No one died during this segment of the voyage, at least in these versions: and with the purification Zeus' wrath ends. If, later in life, Jason suffers and dies, that has later causes; and Medea's ultimate fate is marriage to Achilles in the Isles of the Blest (Apollonius 4.875, Apollodorus *Epit.* 5.6, Ibycus apud Schol. Apollonius 4.814). Poseidon feels slighted by Inachus, and in anger dries up the rivers; Hera is angry with his daughter Io; neither demands blood (Apollodorus 2.1.3. and 4). The Proetides are driven mad, and wander about, thanks to the wrath of Hera (Bacchyl. *Epic.* 11.53, Pherecydes apud Schol. *Od.* 15.225); in Bacchylides they are cured by Artemis Hemera, while in Pherecydes Melampus effects the cure; in both sources the goddess is content with madness and no blood is drawn. Tiresias is blinded, not slain; Auge is merely banished; Thetis merely must marry Peleus; and so on.

The view that Artemis is so angry with Oeneus that "only human blood will do" would seem to invite the obvious comment that during the

course of the hunt human blood *is* shed: “many men” (*Iliad* 9.546); Ancaeus, Hyleus, Eurytion (Apollodorus 1.8.2); Agelaus (Bacchylides). (Most says wrongly that “only Ancaeus is killed during the hunt.”) But such blood does not content Most: “the boar is slain without Oeneus or his family being harmed” (206). Only *family* blood, he thinks, will satisfy divine wrath. This startling claim is refuted by two major episodes in Homer himself: the wrath of Apollo at Agamemnon in *Iliad* Book 1 costs many lives, but not Agamemnon’s or his family’s; and this wrath we see appeased in Book 1, so that no later calamity can be attributed to it. The wrath of Poseidon with Odysseus ends when Poseidon realizes its futility, when “against the will of the other immortals he can accomplish nothing” (*Od.* 1.78-9). It does not destroy Odysseus or his family; it is doubtful that even the death of Odysseus’ companions can be laid to it, for the blame is assigned to Zeus and their own greed (Aeolus), incaution (Laestrygonians), ill-luck (Laestrygonians, Scylla) and disobedience (oxen of Helius).

Of course Most’s errors hardly prove that Artemis, in the pre-Homeric story of the Calydonian boar, needed a second provocation to aim her second blow at Oeneus’ family. In Bacchylides, for example, Artemis simply remains savagely angry — but Bacchylides’ Meleager can hardly afford to mention Atalanta, and Bacchylides had Homeric precedent for sliding over an awkward problem. Rather, we argue that by assigning to the pre-Homeric source a motif found in Arcadia in 600 B.C., we make the goddess’ stance much more intelligible. We get a better story. And of course we can say why Homer is evidently abbreviating here: Atalanta is not compatible with Cleopatra.

But however we account for Artemis’ rage, we also need to know the human motivation. How were Meleager and his uncles inspired to fight about the trophies? Most is silent on this point. Homer is too; but Homer can afford to be, because the crux of his story is the much later event of the Wrath and Supplication of Meleager. Bacchylides moves even more rapidly than Homer, from Artemis’ wrath directly into the war. But Bacchylides again has his reasons: Meleager is to look as if his killing of his uncles is wholly due to the blind chances of war. But for Homer’s source, for any narrator to whom the hunt itself and its tragic outcome are central, the quarrel — if there is one — must be given a human cause as well as a divine one.

Our testimony offers two solutions to the problem:

1. A writer whom Apollodorus quotes makes Meleager’s uncle Iphiclus claim the skin on the grounds that he hit the boar first. This motif,

though perfectly appropriate to other ways of telling the story, does not belong in the initiatory version. It is wrong for an uncle, a certifier, to compete with the novitiate, either by attempting to kill the boar himself or, if he has struck the animal by accident, by claiming the trophies as a reward for his own prowess. (See also our article, 156).

2. The other versions, including the one we are reconstructing, have the Thestiades object to Atalanta's receiving the trophies: if Meleager does not keep them, they must go to the Thestiades *kata genos*. This motif is perfectly suited to initiation, and gives the Thestiades an excellent reason to quarrel, the same reason as Artemis. Both goddess and mortals are offended by the intrusion of an act of courtship into the initiatory hunt. Artemis, we may guess, encourages the uncles to express their feelings and press their case.

Our discussion so far has yielded the following:

1. The motif "Meleager gives the trophies to Atalanta" is as early as 600 B.C., is well established in Arcadian tradition as recorded by Pausanias, and is the only way that the existing evidence will explain the presence of the boar's tusks at Tegea.

2. Homer's account omits some details of the hunt. Since he is willing to spend time on the size of the boar, and the destruction of fields and crops it caused, it was not merely to save time that he deleted the story of the hunt itself; he probably omitted material that was incompatible with his own version.

3. We need to know why Artemis provoked Meleager's quarrel with his uncles. A goddess who has struck once, and so effectively, ought to receive a second affront before she strikes again.

4. Apart from Artemis' provocation, we need a human motivation for the quarrel.

All our questions are answered, and answered elegantly, if we advance the modest hypothesis that the motif "Meleager gives the trophies to Atalanta" was in Homer's source. This means putting it about 150-200 years earlier than we have already, a not very venturesome step to take. Nor is it daring to suppose further that "Meleager loves Atalanta" also belongs in our source. No one will believe that a disinterested sense of justice was enough to provoke the hero to challenge his uncles and the tradition of the initiatory ritual.

In place of this elegant solution, Most proffers confusion. He asks: “Can no other offense be found in the tradition which could account for his failure” in the initiation (208)? His nomination is the killing of the uncles. But this does not give the cause of the failure: it *is* failure. The question we need an answer to is, “What caused the *killing*?” And the answer we offer is, “Artemis’ renewed rage, inspired by Meleager’s inappropriate love for Atalanta.” To this question Most offers no answer at all.

* * *

Most expended much of his critical energy (8 of 13 pages) attacking our early dating of the “Meleager loves Atalanta” motif. We have attempted to answer him point for point because — apart from the inherent desirability of getting at the facts — we think that our comparison of the two tales benefits from an early dating of this motif. We could have compared the pre-Homeric *Odysseus* with the Euripidean *Meleager*. But the essence of our analysis of *Meleager* is that the hero’s love intrudes upon his initiation; and to suppose that Euripides recognized the Calydonian hunt as initiatory is very risky. By his day the myth had become famous as another common Hellenic endeavor, like the Trojan War and the Argo.

The main purpose of our original paper, however, was to develop a model for analyzing myths belonging to a definable set. Most’s criticism of this model dealt with three issues: our emphasis on temporal sequence, our “*salto mortale*” from the motif-type to motifemic level, and the semi-oticity of our approach. In answering this criticism, we hope to have clarified our position and to have set out more fully the logic of our model.

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NOTES

¹ A logical interpretant of a literary sign is virtually the same as an interpretation. For more technical definitions of the term, see Nancy Rubin (1983:10) and David Savan (1980:252-62).

It is important for Peirce that the sign was part of an indissoluble triad: sign, object, interpretant. Neither cornerstone of this triadic relation existed independently; hence Peirce would not be subject to the kind of criticism leveled at those who separate form and content (meaning).

² Scopas did the sculptures for the temple of Alea Athena at Tegea. On the east pediment the Calydonian hunt was depicted. Ancaeus, wounded seriously, has dropped his axe and has to be supported by his brother. Atalanta is very prominent (Paus. 8.45.4-7); indeed A. F. Stewart thinks that she was depicted killing the boar (1977:62). If so, it is surprising that Pausanias does not mention Atalanta's deed; earlier he says only that she was the first to hit the animal (8.40.2). Stewart's arguments must be judged by the authorities; if he is right, Scopas must have been building on an Arcadian tradition in which Atalanta was at least as prominent as Pausanias makes her. For Scopas the Parian was expressing Arcadian belief, not his own.

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